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ARTICLE EIGHT: A PREMISE AND 
THREE PROBLEMS 
Ernest L. Folk, Ill* 
T HIS essay concerns itself with a basic premise and three problems concerning investment securities under Article Eight of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (Code). Although some amount of relevant 
exposition is necessary to make the arguments intelligible, general 
familiarity with the essentials of the Code's treatment of investment 
securities is assumed.1 
I. THE NEGOTIABILITY PREMISE 
Article Eight's overriding objective is to confer full negotiability 
upon all investment securities, as shown by section 8-105's avowal 
that "securities governed by this article are negotiable instruments."2 
While Article Eight represents the embodiment of pre-existing law, 
it also makes several important changes. Prior to the Code, no single 
statute governed all investment securities. Although shares of stock 
were implicitly made negotiable by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 
the status of many bonds, which were subject to the Uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Law (NIL), remained in doubt. This was so be-
cause bonds are often made payable only out of designated funds 
(such as, municipal bonds) or from earnings (income bonds), both of 
which violate the NIL requirement that a promise to pay be uncon-
ditional, 3 while other bonds which, on their face, bear an uncondi-
tional promise to pay are often accompanied by trust indentures to 
• Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1952, Roanoke; 
LL.B. 1956, Virginia; M.A. 1958, Virginia.-Ed. I am deeply grateful to Professor Alfred 
F. Conard of the University of Michigan Law School for the opportunity to have dis-
cussed many Article Eight issues and questions with him and for his reading of this 
article in manuscript. 
1. Writings dealing more specifically with exposition include Folk, Article Eight: 
Investment Securities, 44 N.C.L. REv. 654 (1966), and two excellent articles by Carlos 
Israels: Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper-Article 8 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 13 .Bus. LAw. 676 (1958) and Investment Securities Problems-Article 8 of 
the UCC, 11 How. L.J. 120 (1965). 
2. Uniform Commercial Code § 8-105 (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.J. It is interesting 
to note how this section dovetails with some state "legal investment statutes" which per-
mit investment only in securities which are "negotiable instruments." See Israels, Invest-
ment Securities in New York: Statutory Text and Commercial Practice, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 
108, 112 (1962). 
3. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 1(2) [hereinafter cited as N.I.L.J. Com-
pare U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(b). The NIL retained the common law concept that a bond must 
contain an unconditional promise to pay in order to be negotiable. Most state legisla-
tures, however, specifically conferred negotiability upon municipal, and other, bonds 
payable from designated revenues, taxes or other funds despite the fact that their pay-
ment was so conditioned. 
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which the bonds are declared "subject."4 Additionally, the negotia-
bility of registered-form bonds was placed in doubt by language in 
the registration provisions requiring transfer "on the books" of the 
corporation which seemingly contravenes the NIL's prescribed mode 
of negotiation.5 Other securities, such as equipment trust securities, 
American Depositary Receipts, and interim receipts also probably 
were non-negotiable prior to the Code, absent special statutes enacted 
only in an occasional state.6 
The near universal acclaim of Article Eight is grounded largely 
on its removing these (and other) impediments to full negotiability. 
In this respect, not only does Article Eight unify but it also culmi-
nates prior law by establishing broad negotiability and by viewing 
all securities as sufficiently similar in character that they can properly 
be governed by the same rules without distinction between equity 
and creditor securities. Although the latter assumption is certainly 
sound, the former and more basic premise-that all investment secu-
rities are and should be negotiable-has apparently never been seri-
ously questioned. At this point, however, it is desirable to ex-
plore the validity of this premise in order to determine whether the 
Code strikes a fair balance between the underlying, indeed conflict-
ing, policy objectives operating in the area of investment securities. 
In assessing such a policy balance, it is instructive, but not conclu-
sive, to note that the trend has been toward negotiability of securi-
ties. The established and unquestioned negotiability of notes, and 
drafts, however, need not require that investment securities, which 
are substantially different from commercial paper in character and 
function, also carry the capacity to extinguish defenses of the issuer 
or claims of prior owners or of others having interests in the security. 
The negotiability of investment securities necessarily means that, 
in the event of conflict, the interests of the "true owners"7 are sub-
ordinated to those of the purchasers. However, since securities, un-
like commercial paper, are either long-term (bonds and debentures) 
or permanent investments (stock and some other equity instruments), 
and presumably are acquired for the long haul, it is arguable that the 
4. See text accompanying notes 60-62 infra. 
5. See text accompanying note 59 infra. 
6. Security receipts and equipment trust certificates were declared negotiable by New 
York's Hofstadter Act, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 260 (McKinney 1962). 
7. Throughout this article I shall use the term "true owner" to refer to the regis-
tered owner of a security who is in possession or has the right to possession of that secur-
ity. In Article Eight the term is used only in § 8-404(2); usually, the unmodified word 
"owner" appears, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 8-311 8: 8-315(2). Thus defined, "true owner's" interest 
in a security constitutes an "adverse claim" within the meaning of § 8-301(1) and there-
fore can be protected in various ways. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 8-403 8: 8-405. 
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established ownership of securities merits greater protection than the 
ownership of short-term commercial paper. Unhampered or unde-
layed circulation of investment securities is not as essential as is the 
instant transferability of commercial paper which should approxi-
mate the free circulation of money. Moreover, all legitimate interests 
of both sellers and buyers would be served if purchasers of securities 
were obliged to observe the rights of others. Given a system of rules 
premised on the maximum protection of "true owners," mechanisms 
would undoubtedly be developed by which purchasers could guard 
themselves against loss from defenses or adverse claims unexpectedly 
asserted against them; for example, security prices might be adjusted 
downward in the marketplace to reflect such uncertainties, and forms 
of insurance, not easily pictured in the light of the present system, 
could evolve. Nor would the purchaser inevitably suffer, at least not 
in the long-run. For today's purchaser who loses out to the claim of a 
true owner under this hypothesized system of rules would, as tomor-
row's "true owner," possess a title to securities which could not readily 
be divested by a purchaser who supposedly acquired superior rights. 
Perhaps speculators unable to acquire prior rights would suffer delays 
and other difficulties which would temper their enthusiasm, but this 
would not necessarily be an undesirable result. We could assume 
that, under such rules, securities transfers would be less swift and 
certain than at present, but still be substantially faster and easier 
than real estate transactions under current property laws. 
A further reason which could be advanced in support of a system 
premised on non-negotiability is its inherent potential for compelling 
greater caution in the transfer of investment securities. Under this 
hypothetical system, a purchaser, who takes the security subject nec-
essarily to any adverse claims whether or not known or knowable, 
would surely be entitled either to a clean security free of such 
claims,8 or to damages. Whatever the remedy sought, the purchaser's 
demand would work its way back through the buying broker and 
transfer agent, and eventually come to the selling broker who han-
dled the sale of the original tainted security. Presumably, the selling 
broker would sustain a converter's liability for participating in the 
wrongful transfer; therefore, he would probably insure against this 
liability, while retaining rights against the seller who perpetrated the 
original wrong. Or, more likely, since the market custom is for the 
8. Under the existing system, compare the New York Stock Exchange "Reclamation 
Rules," N.Y. Stock Exch. Rules 265-75, particularly Rule 272, permitting reclamation 
at any time "by reason of the fact: (I) That title to a security is called in question •••• " 
CCH N.Y.S.E. GumE 1J1J 2265-75. 
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selling broker promptly to register transfer of the security out of the 
seller's name and into a name acceptable for transfer under securities 
exchange rules, 9 special care would be exercised at the threshold to 
assure that a "clean" security goes into the market. Thus, a non-nego-
tiability concept would compel brokers to exercise greater care than 
at present to assure the integrity of transactions-a result with which 
no one can quarrel. 
It is evident, then, that we can establish on a premise of non-
negotiability an entirely rational system which would generously 
serve important policy objectives. The questions that now must be 
considered are: what major interests are promoted by the existing 
system which rests on the opposite premise, and does the existing 
system sufficiently protect the "true owner." 
Unfettered negotiability of securities reflects the custom and prac-
tice of the investment community which regards the principles that 
purchasers prevail over "true owners" and that issuer defenses be 
extinguished by the sale as indispensable to swift, easy, and standard-
ized transactions. Clearly, the purchaser can be more confident if he 
knows he will not be bound by defenses and claims of which he is 
ignorant and, further, that he need not search them out. Hence, from 
the purchaser's standpoint, the reliability of securities transactions is 
increased. Moreover, the very fact that the purchasers are thus fav-
ored benefits the true owners as well, since they now know that they 
can sell their securities in a market which is broader, more certain, 
and better able to absorb their offerings; indeed, the existence of this 
ready market stabilizes and perhaps enhances the value of securities 
which are merely held as well as those which are sold. Thus, nego-
tiability both promotes and reflects the quality of the market for in-
vestment securities. 
Another consideration is that "true owners" and issuers are in the 
best position to protect their own interests. The issuer, for instance, 
can simply comply with all of the legal requirements when creating 
a security and thus obviate any need to assert "defenses" based on 
invalidity under statute or charter;10 just as it can minimize the once-
common risk of irresponsible employees issuing securities to them-
selves for personal gain.11 "True owners" of securities can also best 
protect their interests: they can avoid indorsing securities and thereby 
9. See N. Y. Stock Exch. Rules 199-201, CCH N.Y.S.E. GUIDE ,J,J 2199-201. 
10. The two principal provisions on issuer defenses are U.C.C. §§ 8·202 &: 8-215. 
11. See, e.g., Hudson Trust Co. v. American Linseed Co., 232 N.Y. 350, 134 N.E. 178 
(1922); Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N.Y. 652, 43 N.E. 68 (1896); Havens v. Bank 
of Tarboro, 132 N.C. 214, 43 S.E. 639 (1903). U.C.C. § 8-205 adopts the rule that the 
signature of a transfer agent, registrar, authenticating trustee or any of their employees 
"entrusted with the responsible handling of the security" will bind the issuer. 
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prevent thieves and unauthorized persons from passing title;12 they 
can select honest, reliable, and bonded fiduciaries13 and can bring to 
account trustees who ·wrongfully transfer securities; and when securi-
ties are lost or stolen, they can invoke standardized procedures to 
protect their interests.14 Thus, the greater ability of "true owners" 
and issuers to minimize the risk of loss or harm to all concerned in 
large part supports the negotiability rule. In contrast to the "true 
owners" and issuers, purchasers are poorly situated to protect against 
such risks, particularly in the impersonal transactions on organized 
markets involving securities which are today viewed as fungible.15 
Even further, I suggest that underlying all the arguments in sup-
port of negotiability there lies an unarticulated policy favoring the 
ready circulation of securities, as against the stagnancy of unchanged 
ownership. Policy seemingly favors the continuous, on-going process 
of exchanging property-for the myriad reasons people buy and sell 
property-and transactions in investment securities are certainly 
facilitated by negotiability concepts. Perhaps favoritism to any ac-
quirer, including the bona fide purchaser of securities, is intrinsic to 
a capitalistic system or, even more generally, to a society which is 
restless physically, mentally, and economically. In all events, the law, 
as it has evolved, simply recognizes that negotiability inheres in the 
structure and technique of the organized securities markets as they 
exist today. 
Even so, the existing system well protects the true owner when he 
most needs it, namely, when his indorsement is forged. Here, he may 
usually recover even from a bona fide purchaser16 and, perhaps more 
important, he may always recover from the issuer or transfer agent 
who registered transfer on the forgery.17 The latter are usually fiscally 
responsible and probably insured, and if they must respond in dam-
ages or issue a new security to the aggrieved owner, they also have 
rights over against the person, normally a bank or brokerage house, 
which guaranteed as genuine the signature which was in fact forged.1B 
12. See generally, U.C.C. § 8-315. 
13. See U.C.C. § 8-304(2) for the rule that purchasers need not inquire into the right-
fulness of transfer of a security registered in a fiduciary name. 
14. See U.C.C. §§ 8-403(1)(2)(a) (stop transfer notice) & 8-405(2) ("lost, destroyed or 
wrongfully taken" security). 
15. For the view that securities of the same issue are fungible, see U.C.C. § 8-107(1) 
and comment 1. 
16. ".Bona fide purchaser" is defined in U.C.C. § 8-302, and the right of recovery is 
stated in § 8-315(2). However, if the bona fide purchaser has received from the issuer 
or transfer agent a new, reissued, or re-registered security in his own name, he is pro-
tected even against the true owner. U.C.C. § 8-311(a). 
17. U.C.C. § 8-311. Whether or not the true owner may go against the purchaser (see 
note 16 supra), he may still recover from the issuer. U.C.C. § 8-404(2). 
18. u.c.c. § 8-312. 
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Admittedly, absent a forgery, but where delivery is improper for some 
other reason, the true owner has no rights against either the bona 
fide purchaser,19 or in most cases the issuer or its transfer agent,20 
nor does he have rights against a signature guarantor.21 Nevertheless, 
it is precisely in this situation that the true owner can most readily 
avoid the circumstances which cause or at least contribute to the loss. 
Thus, while the true owner lacks the preferences which he would be 
afforded under the hypothesized system based on non-negotiability, 
the protection he is afforded under the existing system is substantial. 
Although these affirmative reasons, standing alone, sufficiently 
support full negotiability of securities, it is well to stress the extent 
to which a system of non-negotiability would inhibit the operations 
of the securities markets, especially where transactions have been, or 
are becoming, computerized. If a security is, in fact, non-negotiable 
-as is presently the case with some investment media not within the 
Code definition22-the purchaser takes it without confidence that he 
can ever prevail over the claim of the true owner, as indeed he can-
not. It is no answer that he would have rights over against someone, 
however financially responsible and well-insured that person might 
be. At best, the state of his "title" to the security would be in doubt, 
and collection of damages or acquisition of a new security (whose 
purity might later be impugned) would be delayed, wholly apart 
from the expense of possible litigation over the matter. For the pur-
chaser gains no immunity from adverse claims to a non-negotiable 
instrument merely because he does not and could not reasonably be 
expected to know of them. The taint would apply equally whether 
the purchaser acquired a certificate in the seller's name or one regis-
tered into a nominee or even into the purchaser's own name, since 
non-negotiability entails the adverse claim's continuing in the new or 
reissued certificate. Indeed, far from coexisting with the view that the 
certificate subsumes all intangible rights,23 non-negotiability would 
19. u.c.c. § 8-315(1). 
20. U.C.C. § 8-404(1). Of course, the issuer is still bound to discharge any limited 
duty of inquiry it might have under the immediate circumstances of the case (see U.C.C. 
§ 8-403), and throughout the transaction it must act in "good faith." U.C.C. § 1-203. 
A transfer agent or registrar has the same potential liability to third persons as does 
the issuer. U.C.C. § 8-406(1)(b). 
21. The true owner has no claim under a signature guarantee since, under U.C.C. 
§ 8-312(3), he is not a person "taking or dealing with the security in reliance on the 
guarantee ••.. " Love v. Pennsylvania R.R., 200 F. Supp. 561 (ED. Pa. 1961); Eulette 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & .Beane, 101 So. 2d 603, 666 (Fla. App. 1958). How-
ever, dictum in Love suggests that a true owner would have a claim against a signature 
guarantor who had "actual knowledge of the impropriety of the transaction." 200 F. 
Supp. at 563. Similar rules would presumably apply to the indorsement guarantee rec-
ognized by § 8-312(2). 
22. U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(a). 
23. That the security itself subsumes and incorporates the intangible rights is well 
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demand priority for the true owner's intangible rights and their sur-
vival despite the issuance of a new certificate. Clearly, non-negotiabil-
ity would bring the securities markets to a grinding halt: one cannot 
conceive how the markets could handle in a day's time several thou-
sand transactions, let alone the ten million share day which has be-
come increasingly frequent. Furthermore, the computerization of 
stock transfers, now adopted in large part by the New York Stock 
Exchange and recognized by the Code, would serve little purpose if 
effective delivery could not be made by "appropriate entries on the 
books of a clearing corporation."24 The use of such facilities, which 
are virtually demanded by today's market volume, and their feasibil-
ity and economy, are premised on the certificates being the sole re-
pository of the intangible rights to be transferred, on the fungibility 
of securities of the same issue, and on the eradication of issuer de-
fenses and adverse claims through the very process of transferring 
securities within the organized markets. 
Finally, the argument that non-negotiability would compel 
greater caution by selling brokers is only superficially persuasive. If 
a selling broker has a converter's liability for aiding in a wrongful 
transfer of a security, he could protect himself only by a full investi-
gation, not merely of the seller's identity ("know thy customer"), but 
of the rightfulness of the seller's proposed transfer as well. One ob-
jective of the Code, and of the earlier Uniform Act for the Simplifi-
cation of Fiduciary Security Transfers, is to eliminate the bottleneck 
under the old law, which resulted from the fact that a transfer agent 
could safely register transfer of a security, especially one held by a 
fiduciary, only after an often intensive, expensive, and time-consum-
ing investigation. Under a non-negotiability premise, the selling 
recognized. E.g., United States v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 244 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W .D. 
Mo. 1965); Lesavoy Indus. Inc. v. Pennsylvania Gen. Paper Corp., 404 Pa. 161, 171 A.2d 
148 (1961) (Uniform Commercial Code); Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939) 
(Uniform Stock Transfer Act). U.C.C. § 8-317(1) carries this principle to its logical con-
clusion by making an attachment or levy on a security ineffective unless it is "actually 
seized" by the levying or attaching officer. 
24. Section 8-320(2) provides for an effective transfer of securities by entries on the 
books of the clearing coporation, even though the entries identify no particular securi-
ties, but "refer merely to a quantity of a particular security" treated "as a part of a 
fungible bulk," and even though entries are made on a "net basis taking into account 
other transfers or pledges of the same security.'' As the text indicates, such entries can 
operate as a delivery under § 8-313(l)(e). The New York Stock Exchange currently 
utilizes a "central certificate" system by which ownership of shares is transferred be-
tween members of the NYSE Stock Clearing Corporation's Central Certificate Service 
by entries rather than by the pre-existing procedure of physical transfer of securities. 
To enable the system to begin operations, members delivered a designated number of 
shares to the clearing corporation, which then combined these into very large denomi-
nation certificates (worth as much as $10,000,000 each). See Wall Street Journal, June 
10, 1965, p. 10, col. 3; id., June 2, 1966, p. 1, col. l; id., Sept. 7, 1966, p. 3, col. 2. 
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broker, because of his ultimate liability, would experience the same 
compulsion to inquire into the rightfulness of a transfer. Merely to 
state this proposition is to demonstrate the difficulty created at the 
very threshold of the transaction, for self-protection would force the 
broker to investigate each security transfer, not just selected or sus-
picious trades. Such inquiry, while simple and routine for many 
transfers, could become complicated and time-consuming and would 
introduce at an earlier stage in securities sales the burdensome 
obligations which the old law placed upon transfer agents. This 
would unduly inhibit the free fl.ow of securities into the market. In-
surance would be no answer, for insurers would pressure brokers to 
make the necessary inquiries; and if the risk experience proved bad, 
premiums would be high, perhaps prohibitively so, if indeed the in-
surance industry would accept the risk at all. Signature guarantees 
would also not help, since they go only to the genuineness of the sig-
nature.25 It would be necessary for prudent brokers to procure in-
dorsement guarantees26 vouching for rightfulness of transfers, and no 
prudent indorsement guarantor would act without inquiring, even 
if he too had insurance. 
Thus, it appears that the amount of protection that a non-nego-
tiable system would provide to true owners is excessive. If it is a good 
policy to force selling brokers to use greater care, this should be ac-
complished, not with the blunt instrument of declaring securities 
non-negotiable, but rather with the fine chisel of redefining and 
thereby elevating certain specific duties of brokers. Arguably, within 
the existing system, some protection for brokers could be withdrawn 
by repealing section 8-315, which relieves brokers of liability for 
innocent conversion. Alternatively, the SEC, the self-regulatory agen-
cies, or both could stiffen existing rules requiring brokers to scruti-
nize proposed transactions, without forcing on them a full dress in-
vestigation of adverse claims which the Code and the Simplification 
Act have rejected for transfer agents. 
The negotiability concept, as it has worked itself out in the con-
text of investment securities, is justifiable apart from arguments 
as to the desirability of destroying or basically altering the established 
nexus of customs, market practices, and legal rules. Sacrificing the 
extra margin of protection for true owners obtainable from a differ-
ent set of premises does not seem to be an undue cost for the advan-
tages to purchasers, and ultimately to sellers, which a market 
25. See U.C.C. § 8-312(1), whose postamble states that "the [signature] guarantor 
does not otherwise warrant the rightfulness of the particular transfer." 
26. u.c.c. § 8-312(2). 
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grounded upon negotiability provides for everyone. Given the exist-
ing measure of protection for true owners, the balance of convenience 
seems properly struck and thus the underlying premise of Article 
Eight is, in my view, fully justified.27 
II. INADEQUACIBS OF THE DEFINITION OF "SECURITY" 
The ambit of Article Eight's coverage is fixed by its definition of 
"security.''28 Thus, the benefit of the Code rules, the liabilities and 
duties the Code imposes, and the corresponding clarity and certainty 
of this area of the law extend no further than this definition.29 Differ-
ing markedly from the expansive meaning of "security" in federal 
and state securities statutes,30 whose purpose is to encompass every 
means of defrauding investors, the object of the Code definition is 
to make negotiable only those instruments currently accepted in the 
markets as established investment media. In brief, a security under 
the Code is an "instrument"31 meeting four conditions: (I) it is in 
bearer or registered form;32 (2) it is one of ( or divisible into) a class 
or series of instruments (as distinguished from being a unique instru-
ment) ;33 (3) it evidences either an issuer's obligation, a share, a par-
27. It is apparent that courts construing Article Eight will draw on the Article 
Three rules which relate to commercial paper in order to supplement the former. For 
a recent and conspicuous instance, see E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Manufacturer's Nat'! Bank, 
259 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Mich. 1966), in which the court draws an analogy to the rule 
that one who discharges his own commercial paper does not become a holder in due 
course in the process and holds that an issuer reacquiring its own securities for cancella-
tion (warrants, in this case) is neither a bona fide purchaser nor even a purchaser of 
the securities. Id. at 518. However, there is a delicate line which must be observed since 
both § 3-103(1) and § 8-102(l)(b) pretty clearly prevent the direct application of Article 
Three to investment securities. But this should be read as meaning only that Article 
Eight's provisions always govern securities-not as precluding recourse to Article Three 
for pertinent analogies on points not specifically covered by Article Eight and not in-
consistent with the latter's purposes. On the contrary, this certainly is appropriate if 
only because both negotiable commercial and investment paper developed out of a 
common matrix of law merchant and common law and have more similarities than 
differences. 
28. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a). 
29. If a "writing" is a "security" within the definition, then it is governed by Article 
Eight and not by Article Three (Commercial Paper). U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(b). If the instru-
ment is neither an Article Eight security nor Article Three commercial paper, it falls 
outside the Code. Presumably, in this event, rules could be formulated by analogy to 
Code concepts drawn from both articles and applied to such an instrument. However, 
the Code furnishes no guidance to analogical use of its rules for long-term investment 
instruments not covered by the definition of "security." In contrast is § 3-805 making 
certain Article Three rules applicable to commercial paper "otherwise negotiable ••• 
but which is not payable to order or to bearer." 
30. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1964); UNIFORM 
SECURITIES Acr § 401. 
31. "Instrument" is an undefined term in the Code. 
32. U.C.C. §§ 8-102(l)(a)(i), 8-102(l)(c) 8: (d). 
33. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a)(iii). 
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ticipation, or some other interest in property or in an enterprise;34 
and (4) it "is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges 
or markets or commonly recognized . . . as a medium for invest-
ment."35 Since the overall purpose of Article Eight is to make invest-
ment securities fully negotiable, rather than to bar the issue and sale 
of fraudulent investments, the Code definition favors not the unique 
and unusual instrument, but instead the relatively familiar security 
with which the organized markets feel comfortable as a result of cus-
tom and usage.36 Significantly, the Code definition does not contain 
substantive restrictions such as the NIL applied to bonds and deben-
tures, 37 but employs formal and functional criteria. It is not the pur-
pose of this article to elaborate on these definitional conditions.38 In 
general, however, the term "security" as used in the Code covers vir-
tually all currently recognized investment securities. Without distinc-
tion at the definitional level, it includes both equity interests (such 
as shares of stock, voting trust certificates, stock options, warrants and 
scrip, mutual fund shares, and American Depositary Receipts) and 
creditor interests (such as bonds, debentures, and subordinated in-
terests), as well as, presumably, many "hybrid" interests which teeter 
on the thin edge between creditor and equity securities. Included 
also are state and municipal securities, interests in and obligations 
of non-corporate entities such as limited partnerships and business 
trusts, fractional interests in oil and gas, and others. The term "secur-
ity" does not, however, seem to embrace commodity investment con-
tracts. 39 
Despite its breadth, the definition is, in my view, defective in two 
respects. First, although adequate in terms of existing markets, it is 
too rigid to permit "new" forms of investment securities readily to 
acquire negotiability through the traditional avenue of custom, that 
34. U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(a)(iv). 
35. U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(a)(ii). 
36. As Carlos Israels has expressed it, "uniqueness of form must logically militate 
against inclusion in the category [of securities, since] commercial justification for nego-
tiability requires not uniqueness but familiarity." Israels, Investment Securities as Ne-
gotiable Paper-Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Bus. LAw 676, 678 (1958). 
37. E.g., the requirement in N.I.L. § I that the instrument carry an unconditional 
promise to pay a sum certain in money. 
38. For a full analysis of the details of each part of the definition, see Folk, Article 
8: Investment Securities, 44 N.C.L. REv. 654, 655-62 (1966). 
39. Several factors point to this result. A security must be of a type traded "upon 
securities exchanges or markets" (U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a)(ii)), and commodity investment 
contracts are not traded on securities exchanges or markets. Moreover, commodity con-
tracts are not generally thought of as a "medium for investment" in the same sense as 
are listed or unlisted stocks or bonds. See also Sinva Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
&: Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), which held that commodity contracts are 
not "investment contracts" and therefore not a "security" under the federal securities 
acts. 
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is, by gradual acceptance in the money markets. Second, the defini-
tion does not, as I think it should, recognize negotiability by con-
tract. 
A. Repressing Negotiability by Custom 
It can generally be said, both as to commercial and investment 
paper, that, for the most part, instruments have come to be recog-
nized as negotiable through the gradual accretion of customs which 
eventually have been accepted by the courts as binding or, if (as in 
some instances) rejected by the courts, have later been validated by 
statute. Of course, there is an element of chance in the court's accep-
tance of custom; the decision may depend even more than in other 
contexts upon the ability of counsel, the intelligence and responsive-
ness of the sitting judge, the character of the transaction, the factual 
context in which the negotiability issue is posed, the inherent equi-
ties of the situation, and other accidental factors. Yet, untrammeled 
by statutory definitions and aided by judicial receptiveness to custom, 
novel and developing investment securities gradually acquired nego-
tiable status. This is especially evident in an impressive line of 19th 
century English decisions. In succession, the courts held the follow-
ing to be negotiable: non-English government bonds actively traded 
in England;40 scrip entitling the holder to definitive bonds of the is-
suer;41 scrip entitling the bearer to become a registered shareholder 
in an English corporation;42 and finally English48 and non-English44 
corporate debentures. Possibilities of further development in Eng-
land are not prevented by relevant statutory definitions of investment 
security, since the English Bills of Exchange Act does not deal with 
investment creditor securities.45 The grossest example of a statute 
stifling the evolution of a recognized custom of negotiability for in-
vestment securities is the NIL's inclusion of bonds and debentures 
within its overly broad coverage, which resulted in the premature, 
and not very good, codification of an area of law still in the formative 
stage. 
Two classic decisions, which are not dramatically different on 
40. Heseltine v. Siggers, 1 Exch. 856, 154 Eng. Rep. 365 (Ex. 1848); Attorney Gen-
eral v • .Bouwens, 4 M. &: W. 171, 150 Eng. Rep. 1390 (Ex. 1838); Gorgier v. Mileville, 
3 B. &: C. 45, 107 Eng. Rep. 651 (K.B. 1824). 
41. Goodwin v. Robarts, [1875] L.R. 10 Ex. 337, aff'd [1876] 1 A.C. 476. 
42. Rumball v. Metropolitan Bank, [1877] LR. 2 Q.B. 194. 
43. Edelstein v. Schuler &: Co., [1902] 2 K.B. 144; Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v. 
London Trading .Bank, Ltd., [1898] 2 Q.B. 658. 
44. London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, [1892] 17 A.C. 201. See also Bentinck v. 
London Joint Stock Bank, [1893] 2 Ch. 120. 
45. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 &: 46 Viet. 292, c. 61. 
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their facts, highlight the issue. In Goodwin v. Robarts,46 two English 
courts sustained the negotiability of underwriters' scrip for definitive 
bonds to be issued subsequently by the Russian government. A 
broker who held plaintiff's scrip wrongfully pledged it to secure a 
loan from defendants, who were bona fide purchasers without notice 
of plaintiff's interest. By all traditional doctrines of commercial 
paper, the scrip was non-negotiable because of the following facts: 
(I) it was payable not in money but in definitive bonds; (2) the un-
derwriters obligated themselves only to transmit definitive bonds 
when they were received; (3) although the scrip was in form the obli-
gation of the underwriters, it was viewed by the court as a direct 
obligation of the issuer; and (4) traditional promissory words were 
lacking, although the scrip stated that "the bearer will be entitled to 
receive a definitive bond or bonds."47 In sustaining the pledgee's 
rights over those of the original owner, the court rested negotiability 
upon a finding of a more-than-fifty year custom by which scrip for 
foreign government obligations had passed solely by delivery. Repu-
diating any concept of the law merchant as "fixed and stereotyped 
and incapable of being expanded and enlarged,"48 the court broadly 
affirmed the continuing vitality of the "process" by which "what be-
fore was usage only, unsanctioned by legal decision, has become en-
grafted upon, or incorporated into, the common law," and stressed 
the policy objectives of facilitating the ready transfer of securities 
rather than "requiring some more cumbrous method of assignment" 
that would "materially hamper the transactions of the money market 
... and cause great public inconvenience."49 
Manhattan Co. v. Morgan50 involved similar scrip. Here, the 
New York Court of Appeals held the instruments non-negotiable 
under the NIL; thus voiding plaintiff's claim as a bona-fide pur-
chaser of instruments stolen from the true owner and later trans-
ferred to plaintiff. The thrust of the decision is the impossibility 
of holding that the scrip could be negotiable, in the teeth of the 
NIL's express prohibition.51 Even assuming that, absent statute, the 
English view would prevail and that a sufficient custom existed in 
the New York investment community,52 neither precedent nor 
custom could override positive law requirements. The New York 
legislature quickly corrected the result in this case by passing the not 
46. [1875] L.R. 10 Ex. 337, afj'd [1876] I A.C. 476. 
47. The text of the instrument appears at [1875] L.R. 10 Ex. 339. 
48. Id. at 346. 
49. Id. at 353. 
!i0. 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926). 
51. Id. at 48, 150 N.E. at 597. 
52. Id. at 53, 150 N.E. at 599. 
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wholly satisfactory Hofstadter Act, 53 which has since been super-
seded in that state by the Code. Such corrective measures, of course, 
in no way impair the principle of the Manhattan case that custom 
cannot lawfully controvert a statutory requirement. 
This principle remains equally applicable under Article Eight's 
definition of securities which, I suggest, may serve to suppress the 
development through custom of the negotiability of new investment 
securities. The critical Code requirement is that a security be "of a 
type commonly dealt in upon" securities markets or "commonly rec-
ognized . . . as a medium for investment." This very language poses 
a dilemma. A new kind of investment paper-one which has just 
come into being or has been resurrected in response to some felt need 
-by hypothesis cannot be a "security" until it has come to be "com-
monly dealt in upon" markets or recognized as a proper "medium for 
investment." Yet such investment paper is not likely to meet these 
requirements if it cannot in the first instance meet the Code defini-
tion of "security," and thus be assured of negotiability. To criticize 
the Code's definition, one need not assert that new investment paper 
can never achieve the required recognition and acceptance; like the 
salmon, it may succeed in swimming upstream. Nevertheless, if the 
Code definition is likely to retard the recognition of new securities, 
and in particular to chill the climate in which the tender plant of 
incipient custom must grow, then the definition requires criticism 
and correction. At best, recognition as a negotiable security is need-
lessly uncertain if such an explicit Code condition virtually confines 
negotiable securities to those recognized at the time of enactment. 
For this reason, smart money is not apt to take the risk, other things 
being equal, of an instrument of uncertain character. As an example, 
suppose that at some early date American Depositary Receipts have 
just been introduced and that in all respects the receipts comply with 
the Code provisions, except that their hypothesized novelty means 
that they have not been traded in the securities markets or recognized 
as investment media. If the Code definition were in effect at that 
time, it is hard to see how American Depositary Receipts could have 
been securities when introduced, and the likely impairment of their 
sale and transfer would retard any growth in the custom which might 
later be translated into law. 
Another illustration is the order bond. Assume a twenty-year writ-
ten obligation for one million dollars issued by Corporation A and 
privately placed with Insurance Company B. It is made payable to 
B's order but is not registerable. Clearly, it is not a "security" since 
53. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 260 (McKinney 1962). 
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it is in neither registered nor bearer form. 54 Its negotiability will de-
pend on its conformity with Article Three-Commercial Paper. If 
under the instrument the promise is conditional, it will not comply 
with Article Three and thus not be negotiable.55 The same would 
be true if an issuer decided to market, rather than privately place, a 
class of order debentures or bonds. Not only does there appear to be 
no reason for excluding the order instrument from the definition of 
"security," but, further, the restrictiveness of that definition seems 
compounded by the fact that, so far as is known, the order debenture 
or bond is probably not "of a type commonly dealt in upon securities 
exchanges or markets" or "commonly recognized ... as a medium 
for investment." Thus, should order bonds or debentures ever be-
come, for reasons not apparent to us at this moment, an attractive 
means of raising long-term money, they would have to overcome the 
barrier of the Code definition. 
None of this is to argue that codification of the law of investment 
securities is improper. Indeed, the law of investment securities has 
reached a stage of maturity where codification is appropriate. The 
values of certainty and clarity which are furthered by a good codifi-
cation-and on a whole Article Eight is that-may sometimes out-
weigh the inhibitions imposed by statutory language upon judicial 
innovation. However, this is not true when the restrictive definition 
is of the most central term-"security"-in the codified law. For a 
restriction at this point virtually closes off the area of development, 
and makes of the Code provisions a set of house rules for an already 
established category of securities. 
Nevertheless, the definition may not, in the long run, prove so 
restrictive in operation. Thus, legislatures, in response to the needs 
of the investment community, may enlarge the category of negotiable 
securities. _However, such legislation is usually a reaction, often to a 
decision striking down negotiability, and thus is likely to be delayed. 
In the meanwhile, a needless degree of uncertainty will persist. Al-
though there is inescapably some uncertainty while new instruments 
are evolving through mercantile custom toward legally cognizable 
negotiability, this differs from the much deeper doubt as to whether 
a particular kind of new instrument, however often traded, can ever 
be held to be negotiable. It is this latter mode of uncertainty which 
the Code definition needlessly creates; the other type can be, indeed 
should be, tolerated so that novel instruments can be put to the proof 
of the market. 
54. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a)(i). 
55. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b) requires "an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum 
certain in money" for a writing to be "a negotiable instrument within this Article, ••• " 
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In addition, an area for interstitial development of custom may 
exist under the Code definition. The definition does not demand that 
instruments be commonly recognized as "negotiable securities" in the 
strict sense of instruments whose transfer to bona-fide purchasers ex-
tinguishes adverse claims and issuer defenses. Rather, they need only 
be "dealt in" on exchanges or otherwise recognized as a "medium 
for investment." This is a broader concept than "security," as defined, 
since an instrument may be a recognized investment medium but not 
a "security" for failure to comply with the other conditions of the 
definition. Although not explicit on this point, certain language in 
Goodwin v. Robarts56 seemingly requires only proof of a mercantile 
custom of common acceptance and ready transfer, rather than of a 
conscious recognition by financiers and investors that the legal conse-
quences of negotiability-extinguishing defenses and claims-will 
necessarily occur. If this approach can be carried over into the Code, 
then the definition of "security" may possibly leave an opening, how-
ever narrow, so that new forms of investments can mature (that is, 
come to comply with the other conditions of the definition of "secur-
ity") into recognized securities. However, this subtlety is so refined, 
so evanescent, that it is at least doubtful that an instrument not al-
ready traded or recognized will be able to achieve the necessary mea-
sure of acceptance in the markets. 
B. Refusing To Recognize Negotiability by Contract 
Some years ago, a topic commanding interest was the possibility 
of making commercial paper negotiable "by contract." Probably no 
consensus was reached on this point in view of the rigidity of the 
NIL definitions and the weight of the Manhattan57 decision, although 
one scholar concluded that a carefully worded clause which purports 
to make an instrument negotiable would be sustained. 58 There was 
little explicit discussion of the question in the context of investment 
securities, although many investment securities would have benefited 
from a clearly articulated principle favoring negotiability by contract 
terms. For instance, such a principle might have aided the develop-
ment of the registered bond which was always shadowed by the fact 
that its registration provisions were, verbally at least, at variance with 
the doctrine of free and full transferability of negotiable paper. 59 
56. [1875] L.R. 10 Ex. 337, aff d (1876] 1 A.C. 476. 
57. Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926). 
58. Beutel, Negotiability by Contract: A Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 28 
ILL. L. REv. 205 (1933). 
59. For a valuable discussion, although long antedating the Code, see Steffen & Rus-
sell, Registered Bonds and Negotiability, 47 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1934). 
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Similar benefits would have accrued to other instruments, whose 
negotiability under separate statutes such as the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act and the NIL, was not specifically recognized. Such in-
struments include interim receipts (of the Manhattan-case type), 
equipment trust instruments, voting trust certificates, and others. 
It has been contended that the decision in Enoch v. Brandon60 
did recognize negotiability by contract in the context of investment 
securities, 61 although this reading of the case has not been generally 
accepted. In that case the New York Court of Appeals was confronted 
with the question of the negotiability of a bond which was explicitly 
made "subject" to the provisions of the mortgage indenture under 
which it was. secured. The word "subject" appeared to make the 
bond's promise conditional.62 However, the court construed this 
language as referring only to the security backing the promise to pay, 
and not as impairing the unconditional character of the bond's 
promise itself. Thus, the court's skilfully devised formula sustained 
the negotiability of bonds and debentures which, by the established 
practice of the investment community, employ elaborate and detailed 
indentures that set forth the particulars concerning the issue of secur-
ities. Obviously, policy considerations dictated this desirable result 
which was not readily justified by the literal language of the statute 
or the instrument. The bond in Enoch v. Brandon also contained a 
clause which provided that the bonds "are to be treated as negotiable 
and all persons are invited by the [issuer] to act accordingly"63 and 
thus the possible alternative ground of "negotiability by contract" 
was suggested. However, this language at most seems to exhibit the 
parties' intention to make the instrument negotiable, and thus could 
be used as a counterweight to other clauses which possibly cast doubt 
on its negotiability. Certainly, the narrower and more defensible 
reading of the decision is the judicial formula which treats the "sub-
ject to" clause as stipulating rights to the security, rather than as con-
ditioning the promise to pay. 
It is now an academic question whether Enoch v. Brandon did 
endorse negotiability by contract, since indenture bonds are clearly 
negotiable under the Code. However, it is not an academic question 
whether negotiability by contract is congruent with the Code and 
whether as a matter of policy such freedom should be recognized by 
basic commercial law throughout the country. 
60. 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928). 
61. .Beutel, supra note 58, at 221. 
62. 249 N.Y. 263, 266, 164 N.E. 45, 46 (1928). 
63. Ibid. 
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The explicit acceptance and recognition that investment securi-
ties may be made negotiable by contract seems a logical outcome of 
the long-run trend toward full negotiability of securities. Assuming 
that there are possible dangers in making commercial paper negotia-
ble by contract, it seems that many of these risks would not be present 
in the sphere of investment paper. By and large investment securities 
are handled by more sophisticated persons, if only because more 
people have occasion to execute or indorse notes and checks than to 
buy and sell investment paper. Moreover, the public policy of pro-
moting the free transfer of investment paper is furthered by permit-
ting the express acceptance of contract terms which have the effect 
of creating negotiability. In particular, under the Code definition of 
"security,"64 negotiability clauses would make it easier for a "new" 
security to surmount the hurdle of the Code requirement of prior 
general acceptance as an investment medium. In short, the definition 
of "security" should provide that if an instrument meets all of the 
statutory conditions except for general acceptance as an investment 
medium, it is still a security if it contains terms which clearly declare 
that it is a negotiable instrument which is governed by the rules of 
Article Eight of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
However, since such a clause is potentially dangerous, there 
should be safeguards against abuses. The instrument should note 
conspicuously that it is a "negotiable investment security."65 In ad-
dition, the body of the instrument should spell out with clarity, 
though not necessarily with detail, that purchasers for value and 
without notice will enjoy immunity from issuer defenses,66 while 
bona fide purchasers will acquire the security free from adverse 
claims as well. 67 However, too much detail is undesirable since it 
64. U.C.C. § 8-I02(l)(a). 
65. "Note conspicuously" is used as a term of art in the Code. For example, transfer 
restrictions must be "noted conspicuously" to be effective. U.C.C. § 8-204. "Conspicuous" 
is defined in § 1-201(10). 
66. This phrase characterizes the transferee who may successfully resist an issuer's 
defenses on an investment security (see U.C.C. § 8-202(1), (3) & (4)), and it is to be dis-
tinguished from a "bona fide purchaser" (see U.C.C. § 8-302 which is discussed in note 
67 infra), and from a "purchaser for value and without notice of adverse claims who 
has in good faith received a new, reissued or re-registered security on registration of 
transfer." U.C.C. § 8-3ll(a). 
67. Under U.C.C. § 8-301(2), one who qualifies as a "bona fide purchaser" may ex-
tinguish adverse claims. In addition, if a "bona fide purchaser" acquires the security 
by a formally perfect transfer (viz., by delivery of a bearer-form instrument, or by issue 
or indorsement of a registered-form security), then, by virtue of U.C.C. § 8-302, he quali-
fies as a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any adverse claim. 
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might conflict with the specific legal consequences that are spelled 
out by Article Eight. Yet the wording should be specific enough so 
that all persons who acquire the instrument can fairly be said to have 
intended that the instrument be treated as negotiable. 68 Since all 
trading in the investment community assumes the negotiability of 
investment securities, it seems that, as to "new" forms of securities, 
such negotiability by contract would accord with common experience 
and belief. 
Although it should be apparent, it is worth stressing that nego-
tiability by contract would neither impair enforcement of any fidu-
ciary duty under corporate law nor affect liabilities under securities 
statutes. So far as the issuer is concerned, negotiability by contract, 
like the clauses of Article Eight means only that issuer defenses are 
extinguished in the hands of purchasers for value and without notice 
-not that liabilities of an issuer or its management are limited. 
Moreover, any supposition that negotiability by contract would 
promote trading in unsound securities is unfounded. The issuer, in 
the unlikely event that it issues securities which it knows or thinks 
will create defenses, will not be likely to choose language which 
would eliminate such defenses. Furthermore, leaving aside some 
forms of securities which are peddled on the disreputable fringes of 
the investment business, the rather sober and calculating gray emi-
nences of the investment world are unlikely to insert the language of 
negotiability into a new instrument unless they have affirmative busi-
ness reasons for desiring negotiability and have doubts as to whether 
the instrument has that quality under existing law. As for the dis-
reputable elements, it is doubtful that Ben-Jack Cage or others of 
that ilk would envision or perpetrate even more spectacular frauds 
--or that those who dream up investment contracts will create 
weirder forms of deceiving the public-simply because they are 
68. This position involves a tricky problem. It assumes that the explicit statement 
of negotiability is known to and accepted by the purchaser, who thus manifests his 
intent to treat the instrument as negotiable. :But under standard transfer procedures, 
the purchaser may see his certificate only after the transaction (or not at all, if his 
broker keeps it) and so, realistically, he lacks notice. One approach would be to let him 
rescind the transaction upon discovering that his security is negotiable by contract. But 
this is overgenerous and would give him an undeserved means of recapturing paper 
losses. More reasonably, he could be deemed to take the security with notice and be 
bound by its negotiability clause if he does not object within a reasonable (perhaps a 
specified) time after he or his broker acquires the security. This is better, but arguably 
still too generous to investors who probably assume negotiability (if they ever think of 
it) and who are no more likely to be harmed by a security negotiable by contract than 
by one negotiable under the Code definition. Perhaps more to the point would be a 
right of rescission if the security varied in some material respect from what it was au-
thoritatively represented to be. 
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credibly informed that what they choose to call a "security" may be 
made negotiable by contract terms. 
2. Does the Code Permit Negotiability by Contract for 
Investment Securities? 
The concept of pure negotiability by contract seems inconsistent 
with Article Eight's definition of "security,"69 since it could result in 
an instrument being negotiable even though not "of a type commonly 
dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recog-
nized ... as a medium for investment."70 The relevant question, 
then, is whether Article One's general provisions, which are applica-
ble to the entire Code, permit the results which negotiability by con-
tract would create. Admittedly, it is doubtful that these general pro-
visions accomplish this purpose or are even intended to do so, but if 
they do, the Code is undesirably unclear and round-about in author-
izing this result. 
Under section 1-102(3), any Code rule "may be varied by agree-
ment" unless otherwise provided by the Code, "except that the obli-
gations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed 
by [the Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement . . . ." Clearly, 
enlarging the definition of "security" does not itself violate the latter 
clause. Assuming that Article Eight's definition section is a "provi-
sion of this Act," it follows that the definition could be expanded. 
Yet it is by no means clear that so literal a reading is intended by 
section 1-102(3). Instead, "provision of this Act" may not refer to the 
basic definition sections but only to those sections that state legal 
consequences. The relevant Code comments, which use commercial 
paper illustrations, seemingly negate any enlargement of basic defini-
tions. While piously disclaiming "the type of interference with evo-
lutionary growth found in" the Manhattan case, the Code comments 
observe that "private parties cannot make an instrument negotiable 
within the meaning of Article 3 (Commercial Paper) except as pro-
vided in" the relevant definition section of Article Three.71 Precisely 
the same comment could be made about the definition section of 
Article Eight. Thus, we have an instance of a comment, while not 
flatly contradicting Code language, at least limiting needlessly vague 
legislative terminology. 
Nevertheless, the Code comment does seem inconsistent with the 
declared policy of the Code that it "shall be liberally construed and 
69. U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(a). 
70. U.C.C. § 8-102(I)(a)(ii). 
71. U.C.C. § 1-102, comment 2. See also note 50 supra. 
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applied . to permit the continued expansion of commercial prac-
tices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties . . . ."72 
Yet, arguably, even this high-sounding "underlying purpose and 
policy" must be implemented within the defined coverage of the 
Code, so that "agreement of the parties" cannot enlarge the sweep of 
Article Eight beyond the definition of "security" any more than an 
agreement among the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction 
upon a court. 
The fact is that, if negotiability by contract is appropriate for in-
vestment securities, it should be expressly authorized. Based on the 
language of the Code, we can only assume that the status of negotia-
bility by contract is sufficiently ambiguous so as to make it, at best, an 
unreliable tool. Indeed, the Code language is probably inconsistent 
with such broad contractual freedom. The very comprehensiveness 
of the Code-and, more specifically, the admittedly broad scope of 
the definition of "security" -makes it appear pre-emptive of any 
efforts to go beyond the stated limits by contract provisions. Yet even 
if the Code's language in Article One can be read as giving a faint 
"go signal" for cautious moves toward instruments negotiable by 
contract, such an approach may be hypersubtle and at best confusing. 
It is suggested, accordingly, that Article Eight expressly recognize 
negotiability by contract with certain safeguards as suggested above. 
One simple solution would be to reword the crucial clause of section 
8-102(l)(a) as follows: 
A "security" is an instrument which 
(ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or mar-
kets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or 
dealt in as a medium for investment, or by its explicitly stated 
terms conspicuously noted on the instrument is to be governed 
by this Article . .. . 1a 
Ill. THE CODE AND TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS 
It is curious that, as full negotiability becomes the norm for 
investment securities, there has arisen concurrently the need to 
restrict the transfer and the registrat~on of transfer74 of investment 
72. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) & (2). (Emphasis added.) 
73. New matter is in italics. 
74. In the Code, the undefined term "transfer" and its derivatives refer to the pas-
sage of a security or interest therein from one person to another; it roughly corresponds 
to, although it is broader than, the term "assign" which is customarily used in the 
securities industry and in some statutes. E.g., UNIFORM Acr FOR SIMPLIFICATION 
OF FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERS § l(a). "Registration of transfer" refers to the change 
of record ownership of a registered-form security by the act of the issuer or transfer 
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securities. In part, this reflects the increasing divergence between 
close and public corporations; the conventional view being that 
it is often desirable to limit or (if legally possible) preclude the 
transfer of equity interests in close corporations, while facilitating 
the trading in like interests in publicly held corporations. However, 
this is not the whole story, since even publicly held corporations 
routinely use certain transfer restrictions in financing through a 
sale of securities. 
Transfer restrictions are not, in fact, a reaction against the en-
larged negotiability of investment securities. Indeed, were the Code 
to declare that securities are not negotiable instruments, transfer 
restrictions would still be indispensable, since they are directed to 
objectives other than preventing bona fide purchasers from ex-
tinguishing issuer defenses and adverse claims. For small enter-
prises, transfer restrictions are designed to keep the equity interests 
from falling under hostile control or from going outside the limited 
group of original shareholders, or, at least, to limit the extent to 
which these undesired consequences may occur. Close corporations 
commonly employ the following types of transfer restrictions: first 
option arrangements, by which the corporation or one or more of 
the shareholders or some combination of these interests have an 
option to acquire the restricted shares; buy-and-sell arrangements, 
by which the restricted shares are subject to contractual obligations 
between shareholders and either the corporation or other share-
holders or both; and consent restrictions, by which directors or share-
holders must agree to an outside sale of shares.75 Other more stringent 
restrictions are possible, but these are of doubtful validity.76 For the 
publicly-owned corporation, the restrictions are usually desired to 
preserve the exempt status under securities regulations laws of 
transactions by which securities are "privately placed" with a 
limited number of "sophisticated," often institutional, investors77 
or are sold exclusively within the state in which the enterprise is 
incorporated and does its principal business.78 Here the restrictions 
agent; confusingly enough, its counterpart term in other statutes is "transfer," e.g., 
SIMPLIFICATION Acr § l(g). 
75. First option and buy-and-sell arrangements are usually upheld by the courts. 
See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 7.09 8e 7.10 (1958). The validity of consent re-
strictions is more difficult to predict, and even those jurisdictions which have sustained 
them usually impose rather strict requirements of reasonableness on their use. 
76. These would include restrictions which bar any transfer of the restricted 
security, or confine transfer to designated transferees (or classes of transferees), or 
forbid transfer to all but designated persons or classes. See O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 
75, § 7.08 (1958). 
77. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 48 Stat. 77, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1964). 
78, Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(ll), 48 Stat. 906, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1964). 
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may take the form of a "stop transfer" notice, which will block or 
defer registration of transfer until the corporation is satisfied that 
transfer will not impair the exempt status of the transaction under 
which the securities were originally issued. 
The Code neither enlarges nor limits the substantive validity 
of transfer restrictions, but does impose certain form and notice 
requirements.,.9 Substantive validity is determined by corporate law, 
which, generally speaking, has looked askance at transfer restric-
tions both by strictly construing those forms which have been upheld 
and by striking down others-usually invoking policies rooted in 
property law which are opposed to restraints on alienation. Thus, 
the Code section operates only upon "otherwise lawful" restrictions. 
In a hypothetical jurisdiction outlawing all transfer restrictions, 80 
the Code provision would have no role to perform. However, in an 
equally hypothetical jurisdiction sustaining every type of transfer 
restriction, the formal requirements of the Code would limit the 
effect of these restrictions. 
A. "Noted Conspicuously" and "Actual Knowledge" 
The Code denies legal effect to transfer restrictions which are 
not "noted conspicuously" on the security, that is, which are not 
"so ·written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate 
ought to have noticed it."81 This approach works quite effectively. 
Assuming that the original certificate with a conspicuously-noted 
restriction has been indorsed and delivered to the transferee, he can 
return it to his transferor and demand a "clean" certificate which 
is free of any such restriction. Moreover, the receipt of the certificate 
gives the transferee notice of an "adverse claim,"82 namely, the 
issuer's claim that the transfer of the security is subject to certain 
controls, such as a first option or consent arrangement, or a stop 
transfer notice. If the transferee sends such a restricted certificate 
to be registered into his name-that is, to obtain record owner-
ship-he cannot compel the corporation or its transfer agent to 
register transfer of the security. In this case, the restricted certificate 
would be returned to the transferee. The result, then, is that the 
79. u.c.c. § 8-204. 
80. New Hampshire comes close to such a hypothetical jurisdiction in that its 
law bars any corporate by-law that restricts the sale of shares. N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. 
§ 296:14 (1966). 
81. u.c.c. § 1-201(10). 
82. " 'Adverse claim' includes a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful •••• " 
U.C.C. § 8-301(1). A transfer restriction is deemed to be an "adverse claim.'' U.C.C. 
§ 8·204, comment 1. 
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transferee could lawfully rescind the transaction or require the 
transferor to purchase shares on the market (possibly at a higher 
price) in order to furnish a clean certificate. In part this redress 
is based on the transferor's breach of his implied warranty that the 
transferee can obtain registration of transfer into his name.83 Of 
course, there are limits inherent in rescission and related remedies: 
the transferor may be insolvent or absent from the jurisdiction or 
it may be impossible to obtain a clean certificate. However, the 
theory is that the issuer's concern to preserve its interests transcends 
the purchaser's desire to consummate the transaction at no loss 
to himself. 
Usually, the purchaser does not receive the original indorsed 
certificate (whether restricted or not). At least on the organized 
markets, it is nearly universal practice for the seller's broker to 
register the securities out of the seller's name and into a name which 
is acceptable for ready transfer in the securities markets.84 The 
result is that even if a broker was willing to handle a restricted 
certificate-an unlikely situation-the transaction still would not 
proceed, since the issuer or its transfer agent would refuse to register 
transfer out of the seller's name and into a name acceptable for 
market transactions. Thus, in practice, the sale of the security would 
be thwarted at the threshold. The restricted certificate would go 
back to the broker-dealer and thence to the seller. The latter would 
have to forget the sale, comply with the restriction, or seek to have 
the restriction invalidated. 
A restriction which is not "noted conspicuously" is effective 
only against those who have "actual knowledge" of its existence.85 
At first glance, this seems, if not inconsistent with, at least inap-
propriate for, a commercial law system which avowedly subsumes 
the security-holder's intangible rights into a piece of negotiable 
paper to facilitate full and free transferability of the security.86 In-
deed, it would seem more congruent with these objectives for the 
83. See U.C.C. §§ 8-306(2) (warranties of the transferor that the transfer is 
"effective and rightful'? & 8-316 (the transferor's obligation to assist the purchaser 
in obtaining registration of transfer). 
84. See U.C.C. § 8-314(1) defining the point at which the selling customer and the 
selling broker fulfill their respective delivery obligations. 
85. u.c.c. § 8-204. 
86. U.C.C. § 8-317 takes the logical step of providing that a security cannot be 
effectively attached or levied on unless and until "actually seized" by the attaching 
official. The UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT §§ 13 & 14 had permitted attachment or 
levy by injunction, but since the enjoined owner still had the power to transfer the 
certificate to a bona fide purchaser, this attachment by injunction could be thwarted. 
Thus, the Code rule obviously goes farther than earlier uniform statutes in making 
the "security," in effect, the piece of paper. 
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transfer restriction to be effective only if duly noted on the paper 
itself. True, it would be strong medicine to allow a transferee to 
disregard a restriction of which he knew, to the detriment of those 
who desired and needed the restriction. Yet it is their misfortune 
or a result of their incompetence that they did not comply with 
the formal means of giving notice through a recital in the certificate. 
Undoubtedly, the "actual knowledge" provision of the Code 
poses real difficulties. It is hard to pin down the contours of a con-
cept which, in its application, has a disturbing tendency to waver 
back and forth between referring to information which was con-
sciously present to one's mind and to information which the person 
ought to have had present. Problems of proof are not easy. The 
concept seems out of place in the otherwise fairly objective system 
of law embodied in Article Eight. 
An illustration87 suggests some of the difficulties of fitting the 
"actual knowledge" concept into the Code structure. A prospective 
purchaser of shares is told that the corporate by-laws contain a 
transfer restriction which is not noted on the certificate which is to 
be indorsed to him. Although the by-laws in fact contain such a 
restriction (and we assume it to be valid under corporate law), the 
purchaser is subsequently assured by responsible corporate personnel 
that there is no such restriction. Later, the purchaser closes the 
deal only to have the transfer agent either refuse to register transfer 
or insist upon continuing the restriction against him. We may 
assume that it is more profitable to hold the shares than to rescind, 
or that the seller is unable to perform if the purchaser elects rescis-
sion. The question, then, is whether the purchaser had "actual 
knowledge" of the restriction, which would be as binding on him 
as if the restriction had been "noted conspicuously" on the security. 
If he did, the purchaser loses; if not, he is entitled to registration 
of transfer and issuance of a clean certificate. In fact, the transferee 
probably would prevail in this situation, although it is not easy 
to work out his rights under Article Eight because of the complica-
tions created by the "actual knowledge" exception. Absent the 
assurances of no transfer restriction, the purchaser clearly had 
"actual knowledge" of an unnoted restriction. However, the assur-
ances given him significantly change the picture. "The principles 
of law and equity, including ... the law relative to ... principal 
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation ... shall supplement" 
the Code provisions "unless displaced by the particular provisions 
87. I owe this provocative example to Professor Alfred F. Conard of the University 
of Michigan Law School. 
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of" the Code.88 No relevant Code provision displaces normal agency 
rules in this situation, unless it can be said that "actual knowledge," 
once it has been acquired, can never be extinguished in its legal 
effect by denials or representations which happen to be false. How-
ever, the manifest injustice of giving such overriding effect to 
"actual knowledge" should require in this situation that the officer 
who disclaimed the transfer restriction be held to have bound the cor-
poration in so representing, or that he be viewed as having had appar-
ent authority to waive the restriction. Hence, the purchaser, misled 
as he was by the representations (or waiver) should be entitled to 
registration of transfer. Of course, registration could be delayed by 
the issuer or transfer agent. Under the Code, the obligation to 
register transfer is conditioned, inter alia, on two requirements: 
that the issuer either has no duty or has discharged its duty to 
investigate adverse claims (including unnoted transfer restrictions), 
and that the transfer is to a bona fide purchaser.89 Although bona 
fide purchaser status depends on having no "notice of any adverse 
claim," it has been argued that in this situation there has been no 
such "notice," or at least that the apparent notice is legally ineffec-
tive. As for the duty to register transfer, assuming that the transfer 
agent's investigation discloses the situation that has just been de-
scribed, the basic question again arises: whether the purchaser had 
"actual knowledge" of the restriction.90 
To be fair and workable, the "actual knowledge" concept must 
be limited by legal concepts outside of the Code. Only in this way 
can we strike a fair balance between the interests of the misled 
purchaser and those of the corporation invoking an unnoted restric-
tion. Othenvise stated, an unnoted restriction should be narrowly 
construed. Indeed, the very theory of the restriction that is not 
noted but is "actually known" to the purchaser-that he cannot 
justly be permitted knowingly to obliterate the rights of others-
demands a similar limitation upon an issuer-that it cannot fairly 
disclaim the apparently authorized acts of its agents to the detriment 
of purchasers who have relied on those acts. Obviously, the desirable 
result of protecting the misled transferee could be more readily 
achieved if the Code was unencumbered with the "actual knowl-
edge" rule. This would simply require holding the unnoted restric-
tion to be ineffective as to the purchaser, regardless of the informa-
ss. u.c.c. § 1-103. 
89. U.C.C. § 8-401-(l)(c) &: (e). 
90. It might be argued that technically a purchaser had no "actual knowledge" 
of a restriction if information to that effect, albeit true, had been specifically negated 
by authoritative representations. 
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tion which he received and which was subsequently denied. How-
ever, this is not enough to support a conclusion that the "actual 
knowledge" concept should be deleted. For one thing, it offends 
fairness to permit a person to trample on others' rights of which 
he is aware: he has the opportunity to take action which would 
protect those rights, and he should at least take subject to them. 
An even more compelling situation justifying the Code provi-
sion for validating effective, though unnoted, restrictions arises in 
the case of transfer restrictions which are intended to preserve a 
securities act exemption. It may be impracticable to force a prospec-
tive purchaser of securities in an exempt transaction to accept a 
certificate with a legend restricting transfer.91 The issuer may have 
to take some risk of losing the exemption and protect itself with 
an "investment letter" as well as a stop transfer notice of which 
the purchaser is informed.92 Suppose that a purchaser of securities 
under such restrictions disregards his representations in the invest-
ment letter and sells the restricted securities under circumstances 
which may cause the issuer to lose his exemption. If the sale is 
through the organized markets, assuming that the unsuspecting 
selling broker sends the indorsed certificate to the transfer agent, 
then the stop transfer notice will be triggered, registration of trans-
fer will be refused, and the certificate will be returned to the broker 
and thence to the seller. The seller is a "person with actual knowl-
edge" of the unnoted restriction, that is, of the stop transfer notice,93 
91. Refusal to take a certificate with a restrictive legend does not necessarily 
show that the purchaser is taking the security "with a view to distribution" instead 
of with the required intent of investment for an indefinite period of time. On the 
contrary, several factors, in no way inconsistent with an investment purpose, can ex• 
plain such a refusal. For example, changed circumstances may require a premature 
sale, and the purchaser may wish to avoid the delay involved in obtaining an unre• 
stricted certificate from the corporation. Similarly, the fact that a restricted certificate 
may be unacceptable as collateral for a loan may underlie a purchaser's reluctance to 
accept a restricted certificate. 
92. An investment letter is merely a writing, in no prescribed form, in which the 
purchaser states that, as of the time of purchase, he intends to hold the security for 
investment, and that he is not purchasing it with a view to distribution. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission, however, has stressed that an "investment letter" is no 
defense to an issuer faced with loss of its exemption because of a sale in violation of 
the terms upon which the exemption was granted. Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 
at 3 (S.E.C. Nov. 6, 1962). A stop transfer notice with respect to a designated security 
remains with the issuer or its transfer agent, and if the certificate as to which such a 
notice applies comes in for registration of transfer, the issuer or transfer agent will post• 
pone or refuse such registration. Thus an investment letter coupled with a stop transfer 
notice is an effective combination enabling the issuer to control transfers and thus pro• 
tect the securities act exemption under which it made the original sales. The text indi-
cates why this combination works so well. 
93. I assume that the issuer informed the purchaser in the exempt transaction that 
a stop transfer notice affecting his certificate would be placed on file. Without such 
notification, the purchaser would not have "actual knowledge" of the restriction, and 
consequently, the restriction would not be effective against him, 
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and the restriction is good against him, as indeed it should be.94 
He must now, if he can, satisfy the issuer that the security may be 
sold without violating the law; this may mean securing opinions 
of counsel that such sale would not affect the status of the exemption 
or perhaps a no action letter or informal advice from the SEC. 
Thus, the actual knowledge phrase, narrowly construed, is an indis-
pensable supplement to the general rule requiring conspicuous 
notation. It establishes a means by which issuers, who are unable to 
make use of the more rigid forms of transfer restrictions which are 
noted on the certificate, may protect themselves from wrongful trans-
fers. 
B. Scope of the Transfer Restriction Provision 
The Code section in terms, governs only those transfer restric-
tions which are "imposed by the issuer,"95 and thus it does not 
apply to restraints which are imposed by shareholder agreements 
or other arrangements in which the issuer is not involved even 
though the purpose and effect of these arrangements may be identi-
cal. It is unclear why the Code, which supposedly aims at the maxi-
mum feasible coverage, fails to carry forward the rule in the broader 
form in which it appeared in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.96 
Arguably, the Code's casus omissus was motivated by a desire to 
preserve the privacy of shareholder agreements which would be 
lost if any transfer restrictions which they impose must be "noted 
conspicuously" on the certificate. Another possible rationale is 
that the variety of non-issuer transfer restrictions is so great, and 
the incidental problems so varied, that it is better to leave private 
restrictions to case-law development. 
The reasons for enlarging coverage seem more compelling. The 
privacy of shareholder-imposed restrictions, if this be a desideratum, 
simply cannot be maintained in fact. Transferees of restricted securi-
ties will inevitably learn of them, and, depending upon their prior 
knowledge of the restrictions, the transferees will or will not be 
bound by them. Moreover, corporation statutes are beginning to 
require certificate notations of various provisions which may sub-
94. It could possibly be argued that an investment letter alone constitutes a "restric-
tion imposed by the issuer," of which the purchaser who gave the letter had "actual 
knowledge," but I find this argument unpersuasive. First, it overextends the concept 
of a "restriction imposed by the issuer," since the letter is presumably a result of the 
purchaser's voluntary act, even though it may have been the only way in which he 
could get the security. Second, it violates the policy of strictly construing stock transfer 
restrictions. 
95. u.c.c. § 8-204. 
96. UNIFORM SroCK TRANSFER Acr § 15. 
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ject purchasers to unexpected burdens or obligations.97 Thus, the 
arguments from a supposed "right of privacy" run counter to the 
trend toward the mandatory disclosure of all relevant restrictions 
on securities. Even if the secrecy of shareholder agreements could 
be more effectively protected than is now possible, this would be 
undesirable. The policy favoring free transferability of securities 
logically dictates that restrictions be noted whether exacted by the 
issuer or by "private" agreements. Whoever imposes them, undis-
closed restrictions violate the fundamental assumption under which 
investment securities move about in today's markets. 
A clearcut rule, which comprehensively covers all transfer re-
strictions, would promote certainty. In particular, it would ade-
quately protect the interests of both those who impose transfer 
restrictions and those who may be subject to them. In the case of 
"privately" imposed restrictions, there is every reason to give the 
bona fide purchaser without notice the right, which is clearly defined 
in the Code, to take free and clear of undisclosed limitations on the 
marketability of the purchased securities. Such considerations seem 
especially compelling since Article Eight purports to be a compre-
hensive codification of the rules and customs which govern securities. 
The expansion of the Code's limited rule can easily be achieved 
by deleting those words confining section 8-204 to restrictions "im-
posed by the issuer" and transferring the reworded section from 
part two of Article Eight, which governs issuance and issuers, to 
part one, which contains the general provisions of the Article. The 
new section would read as follows: 
Unless noted conspicuously on the security, any restriction on trans-
fer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except against a person 
with actual knowledge of it. 
IV. REGISTERING TRANSFER: THE ISSUER'S DUTIES, 
PRIVILEGES AND LIABILITIES 
Transfers of registered-form securities are subject to certain 
special rules of Article Eight, which represent the first general at-
tempt to codify issuer duties and liabilities in registering transfer 
of securities.98 The Code objective is to simplify and expedite regis-
97. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 6O9(h), 616(c), 62O(g) &: 10O2(c) (McKinney 1963). 
98. The Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers offered 
substantial protection to issuers registering transfers of fiduciary-owned securities, but 
it has not been adopted in all states. The Code provisions in part 4 of Article Eight 
essentially follow the rules established by the Simplification Act and apply them in the 
registration of transfers of all securities. For an excellent article dealing with various 
May 1967] Article Eight 1407 
tration of transfer by requiring the issuer to register transfer when 
certain specified conditions are fulfilled and, at the same time, by 
carefully circumscribing the issuer's liability.99 The basic concept 
is this: if a security has been indorsed by an "appropriate person"100 
whose signature has been responsibly vouched for,101 then a bona 
fide purchaser may have the security registered into his name even 
if its transfer was "wrongful"102 (for example, in breach of trust),103 
and the issuer is no longer liable to the true owner for thus divesting 
him of his record title to the security.104 If, however, the indorse-
ment is unauthorized105 (for example, a forgery), then even a bona 
fide purchaser is denied registration of transfer of the security, 
despite an indorsement by an "appropriate person" and a signature 
guarantee.106 If the issuer does register transfer on a forged signature, 
it remains absolutely liable to the true owner, and must restore 
the security (or its equivalent) to him.107 If the issuer is thus held 
liable, its recourse is against the signature guarantor, normally a 
financially responsible institution. However, the purchaser who has 
been refused registration of transfer because of a forgery also has 
rights against the signature guarantor, whose warranties run "to 
any person taking or dealing with the security in reliance on the 
guarantee .... "108 Since Code rights and liabilities tum in large 
part upon the signature guarantee, it is obviously of great impor-
tance, especially to transfer agents but also to selling brokers, that 
the guarantee itself is genuine and that the guarantor is sufficiently 
responsible financially to meet any liabilities, which are potentially 
quite large, that might arise out of the particular transaction. Sub-
ject to refinements and qualifications, this is the nexus of legal rules 
within which the registration of transfer procedure works smoothly 
for the multitude of daily securities transactions. 
facets of this subject, see Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 MICH. 
L. REv. 843 (1958). 
99. The Code rules as to the duties, privileges, and liabilities of an issuer in register-
ing security transfers apply also to transfer agents, registrars, or others who act for the 
issuer. See U.C.C. §§ 8-201(3) & 8-406. 
100. The phrase, "appropriate person," is defined in § 8-308(3) as conesponding 
roughly to the named owner of the security. 
101. See U.C.C. § 8-312 for the effect of the signature guarantee which may be re-
quired by the issuer as a condition to registration of transfer pursuant to §§ 8-40l(l)(b) 
& 8-402(l)(a). 
102. u.c.c. § 8-401. 
103. See especially U.C.C. § 8-403(3). 
104. u.c.c. § 8-404(1). 
105. "Unauthorized" is defined in § 1-201(43). 
106. u.c.c. §§ 8-311 & 8-401(1). 
107. u.c.c. § 8-404(2). 
108. u.c.c. § 8-312(3). 
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A. The Issuer's Duty To Register Transfer and Liabilities for 
Wrongfully Registering or Refusing To Register Transfer 
The issuer must register transfer if, among other conditions, an 
"appropriate person" has indorsed, the indorsements are guaranteed 
to be "genuine and effective," the issuer has no duty to inquire or 
has discharged that duty, and the transfer is "rightful or is to a 
bona fide purchaser."109 Given these conditions, the issuer is liable 
for any loss which results from unreasonable delay or from failure 
or refusal to register.11° The ease of statement of these rules con-
ceals a variety of difficulties and uncertainties. 
I. When Is the Issuer Privileged Not To Register Transfer? 
In at least two situations, apart from non-compliance with the 
four conditions noted above, the issuer may refuse to register trans-
fers. First, a stop transfer notice in the issuer's records allows it to 
suspend registration pending investigation of the "adverse claim" 
stated in the notice.111 Second, if it knows or suspects that a neces-
sary indorsement is unauthorized, it could certainly delay regis-
tration pending inquiry, or it could refuse registration entirely if 
it is satisfied that there is a forgery.112 In other situations, how-
ever, the Code rules are harder to fathom. 
(A) Suppose that the issuer has no duty to investigate adverse 
claims since it has neither received a stop transfer notice nor de-
manded excess documentation which would give it constructive 
notice of a wrongful transfer.118 The issuer has no knowledge or 
information as to whether the presenter is a bona fide purchaser 
or whether the transfer is rightful. It has only a certificate which 
is duly indorsed by the appropriate person with a signature guar-
antee by a reputable institution. Assume that, in fact, the transfer 
is wrongful, that the presenter knows this, 114 and that such facts 
would be discovered if the issuer inquired. Clearly, the purchaser 
could not enforce registration of transfer; equally clearly, the 
issuer is not liable if it does register transfer in its ignorance. Yet, 
109. u.c.c. § 8-401(1). 
110. u.c.c. § 8-401(2). 
111. U.C.C. § 8-403(2) spells out a clear-cut method which issuers are likely to follow. 
112. This is implied in §§ 8-401 8c 3-404. 
113. The Code seeks to dissuade issuers and transfer agents from continuing to de-
mand excessive documentation by charging issuers with notice of "all matters" contained 
in such documents. U.C.C. § 8-402(4). The lesson is clearly that ignorance is the better 
part of prudence. But cf. Conard, supra note 98, at 860-61, criticizing the Code approach 
in this regard. 
114. The presence of knowledge precludes this purchaser from obtaining bona fide 
purchaser status. U.C.C. § 8-302. 
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could the issuer, under circumstances which impose upon it no 
statutory duty to inquire, adopt a policy of routinely investigating 
the rightfulness of transfer or of the presenter's bona fide pur-
chaser status? Although the old law in effect compelled just this 
sort of investigation, under the Code the issuer should not pursue 
such a policy. Granted, in this precise fact situation, the delay-
indeed, a flat refusal-would be "privileged" since the presenter 
could not enforce registration. This, however, is the luck of the 
draw. The same issuer who safely refused registration on this occa-
sion likely would be liable in other situations for "unreasonable 
delay in registration" as he pursued his private policy of policing 
transfers. Such inquiry would run contrary to the Code policy of 
expediting registration and is thus severely discouraged by the Code 
provisions.115 The issuer should gratefully accept the protection 
tendered him and not undertake to do more than the Code requires. 
(B) Suppose that an issuer is presented with a request to register 
transfer of a trustee-owned security. The issuer scrupulously observes 
the Code policy discouraging demands for excess documentation, 
and no stop transfer notice is outstanding. Nevertheless, as it rou-
tinely checks out the trustee's incumbency from documents per-
mitted by the Code,116 it accidentally, but unmistakably, discovers 
the transfer to be in breach of trust (for example, transfer is ex-
pressly forbidden by the trust instrument or there is no court 
approval despite its being expressly required). If the presenter is 
not a bona fide purchaser, there clearly is no enforceable duty to 
register transfer, and the issuer could lawfully refuse. However, if 
the presenter is a bona fide purchaser, a refusal to register would 
probably give him a right of action against the issuer. Given the 
presenter's uncertain status as a bona fide purchaser in the eyes 
of the issuer and the evident wrongfulness of the transfer, the 
issuer should be privileged to refuse participation in consummating 
such a wrongful transaction.117 The desirable approach, however, 
is not a flat refusal to register, but a delay to investigate further. 
Although the Code does not deal with this precise situation, it does 
115. u.c.c. §§ 8-402(4) & 8-403(1)(b). 
116. U.C.C. § 8-402{l){c) permits the issuer to require "appropriate evidence of ap-
pointment" of a fiduciary. 
117. Welland Inv. Corp. v. First Nat'l .Bank, 81 N.J. Super. 180, 195 A.2d 210 (Ch. 
1963) involved a transfer agent's refusal to register transfer of stock certificates where 
the sale would have violated the Securities Act of 1933. The precise nature of the re-
striction, whether a legend on the certificate or a stop transfer notice or both, is not 
stated in the court's opinion. The court approved the transfer agent's refusal to register 
transfer since the bona fide purchaser status of the purchaser was disputed, and denied 
summary judgment for the purchaser on that ground. 
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state that the issuer may discharge "any duty of inquiry by any 
reasonable means" including the use of a stop transfer notice.118 
The safest approach would be to follow this procedure and defer 
registration for the permitted thirty-day period which would not be 
an "unreasonable delay" creating liability.119 
(C) Suppose that the issuer receives a transferred security which 
impeccably complies with the conditions for registration. How-
ever, it refused to register transfer because the transferor, a domi-
nant figure in the issuer's management or among its shareholders, 
tries to veto the transaction-perhaps because the value of the 
securities has unexepectedly risen over the sale price-by placing 
a stop transfer notice between sale and presentment. Presumably 
the issuer must check out the "adverse claim." But is the delay 
privileged? Although the Code impliedly permits a "reasonable 
delay"-thirty days in the case of the stop transfer order-the 
purpose of this particular delay seems indefensible, since it results 
from a maneuver by a dominant figure using his control over the 
issuer to serve personal ends. Arguably, the issuer has acted ( or has 
been forced to act) in bad faith and without reasonable grounds 
if the personal motives of officers or shareholders prompt its refusal 
or delay. Accordingly, the issuer probably would be liable for lend-
ing its strategic position and powers to further the interests of one 
claimant as against another. In short, an issuer's fiduciary duty 
running to the presenter should limit its privilege to refuse or delay 
registration of transfer. Under the Code, this might be worked out 
through the general requirement of "good faith"120 defined rather 
limitedly as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned."121 It is arguable that this definition is too narrow to permit 
finding a breach of duty where an issuer or transfer agent aids 
one claimant in effecting a dubious power play. However, it is 
probably the most solid ground, under the Code, to attack such a 
manifest impropriety.122 
118. U.C.C. § 8-403(2). Strictly speaking, this provision applies only when there is a 
"duty of inquiry" which in turn arises only from the two situations noted in § 8-403(1). 
119. See U.C.C. § 8-401(2). 
120. An obligation of "good faith" applies to every transaction. U.C.C. § 1-203. 
121. u.c.c. § 1-201(19). 
122. The text example closely follows the facts in Kanton v. United States Plastics, 
Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965). This was not, strictly speaking, a Code case, since 
the Code was in effect in the forum state (New Jersey) and enacted but not at that time 
effective in the state whose law governed the disposition of the case (Florida). However, 
the court "prophesied" as to how Florida would decide the case in the future and used 
both Code and pre-Code law to hold that the transfer agent's refusal to register was 
wrongful, and that the issuer acted in bad faith and without reasonable grounds in 
refusing to register transfer where the personal interests of a controlling shareholder 
., 
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2. When Is the Issuer Privileged To Register Transfer? 
The Code imposes on the issuer duties to register with liabilities 
running both to the true owner for certain wrongful registrations 
and to the presenter for improper refusals or delays in registering. 
When does the issuer have some discretion, without incurring lia-
bility, to delay registration or to proceed promptly with the task? 
Under example (A) in the preceding section, the issuer clearly must 
register transfer and not poke about for some reason to hold up 
registration. 
In example (B), when registration of transfer was questioned 
because of inadvertently obtained but reliable information as to 
the wrongfulness of a transfer, it was concluded that the issuer is 
privileged to defer registration pending an investigation. How-
ever, could a hard-nosed issuer simply ignore these facts, stand on 
the absence of a stop transfer notice, and register transfer into the 
purchaser's name without liability? I believe that it could do so even 
without inquiring into the presenter's bona fide purchaser status. 
Literally read, section 8-404(1) bars liability to the true owner if 
the security carries the necessary indorsements--and we assume 
that it does-and the issuer is not obligated to investigate adverse 
claims. Under section 8-403, the duty of inquiry arises only from two 
circumstances: timely receipt of a stop transfer notice or receipt 
of information of an adverse claim from additional documentation 
which the issuer is entitled to require under section 8-402(4). Noth-
ing in section 8-403 indicates that an investigation is to be compelled 
by the mere possession of facts which impugn the rightfulness of 
transfer, and the thrust of the Code's policy supports this result. If 
the possession of facts ipso facto ( other than those received under 
the transfer notice or from excess documentation) requires investi-
gation on the pain of liability of the issuer to the true owner, an 
issuer, who has suspicions that are more or less well grounded, could 
not safely ignore any information and would feel compelled to in-
quire. This would subvert efforts to simplify security transfers and 
ease the issuer's liability, and would return about half-way to the 
older law imposing broad duties of inquiry. Arguably, the pervading 
obligation to act in "good faith"123 might require investigation 
under these facts, but I think not for reasons later considered.124 
prompted the refusal. I have discussed the case in detail in a note at 44 N.C.L. REv. 854 
(1966). 
12!1. u.c.c. § 1-20!1. 
124. See text preceding note 126 infra. 
1412 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:1379 
In example (C), when an issuer refused or delayed registration 
on the demand of a controlling shareholder-seller who sought to 
block registration for assumed personal motives, we concluded that 
the issuer's act was improper. However, could the issuer (or a 
transfer agent) go ahead and promptly register transfer without 
liability to the objecting seller? Assuming the issuer's willingness 
to flaunt the "request" of a dominant management figure, it likely 
would escape liability under section 8-404 since the security is 
properly indorsed. Once the issuer has determined that transfer 
registration is being held up to further a seller's personal interests, 
the issuer has discharged any duty of further inquiry-assuming, 
indeed, that a demand from the claimant for such a dubious purpose 
created any duty. Registering transfer under these circumstances, 
although risky, would probably be privileged. 
A final example, example (D),125 goes to the scope of the "good 
faith," which under the Code must pervade every transaction. As-
sume a corporation with 500 shareholders, all of whom are scattered 
small owners except for a controlling block held by a trustee for sev-
eral beneficiaries. The corporation does its own transfer work. The 
shares are traded from time to time on local over-the-counter markets. 
On a particular day, a number of trust-owned share certificates come 
in duly and genuinely indorsed by the trustee (an "appropriate 
person") with proper signature guarantees, and other authenticating 
documents. The transfer clerk (I) knows the trustee socially, (2) 
knows for a fact that he is an active stock market trader, (3) has 
heard rumors that the trustee personally lost heavily during the 
1966 bear market, and (4) has heard on good authority that the 
trustee is in Mexico. There are no stop transfer notices nor has 
the issuer sought excess· documentation. Can the issuer honor the 
demands of the purchasers and their agents presenting the shares 
for registration of transfer? No one can assert a priori that an agent 
possessing such information acts in bad faith by registering trans-
fer into the purchasers' names. Nonetheless, I think that the issuer 
must, under these circumstances, investigate in order to protect 
the true owners, and that only in this way can it act "honestly in 
fact." Moreover, to one who is calculating possible losses, the risk of 
liability for the delay which is needed to make the inquiry is much 
less than the risk of a much heavier liability for divesting the trust 
and its beneficiaries of title to the shares. Thus, the best approach 
125. This illustration was suggested to me by the slightly different example in 
Israels, Investmi;nt Serurities Problems-Article 8 of the UCC, 11 How. L.J. 120, 140-41 
~1965~. 
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is to decline to register transfer immediately, pending an investi-
gation. If sued by the purchaser~ for undue delay, the issuer may 
anticipate judicial sympathy for its reluctance to act peremptorily 
in such dubious circumstances. 
This example highlights the difficulty inherent in the "good 
faith" test. The Code seeks to minimize burdensome duties of in-
quiry in order to facilitate security transfers to avoid delays and 
added expenses to transferees. That objective is frustrated if, under 
the guise of "good faith," the issuer is required to track down bits 
and pieces of information incidentally or accidentally acquired or 
to determine the presenter's bona fide purchaser status whenever the 
issuer suspects the transfer to be wrongful. Such investigations into 
potentially complicated and disputed factual matters are precisely 
what issuers and transfer agents should be able to avoid, and to 
require obliquely these inquiries revives the evils of the old law 
which compelled issuers to police security transfers. The "good 
faith" requirement should be invoked only in extreme and un-
usual circumstances. Thus, it would permit delay in example (D) 
but not in example (B); and I believe it could also be used to 
ground the issuer's fiduciary duty in example (C). Although the 
"good faith" test is basically a subjective one, in my view, it still 
must incorporate an objective component: that conduct which others 
who are skilled in the field would regard as decent and honest in the 
particular situation. Prevailing standards and attitudes should be 
respected both by the courts in determining "good faith" and by the 
issuers when they are confronted with an unusual and potentially 
explosive situation. However, "good faith" should be invoked spar- · 
ingly so that issuers and transfer agents may safely rely on the reason-
ably clear-cut Code guidelines for performing their duties in register-
ing securities transfers. 
B. Overissue of Securities 
Occasionally Article Eight, despite its generally forward-looking 
approach, retreats into earlier times, genuflecting as it goes, to 
ancient rules having an almost totemic character. The most con-
spicuous instance of this is the Code's tortured treatment of the 
problem of overissue of securities.126 It enshrines not only the long 
established proposition that an issue of shares in excess of the 
number authorized by the charter is "void" and a "nulE~y,"121 but 
126. u.c.c. § 8-104. 
127. Railway Co. v. Allerton, 85 U.S. 233 (17 Wall.) (1873); New York, N.H. & H. RR. 
v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30 (Ct. App. 1865), 
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also the concomitant but subordinate doctrine that overissued shares 
may not be cured even by retroactively amending the charter.128 
New securities could be authorized and exchanged for the void over-
issue, although this would raise certain problems under existing law 
as to whether the old exchanged "void" shares are lawful considera-
tion for the new "valid" issue. The Code's ritualistic deference is 
mildly absurd; it is not tragic, however, since the overissue question 
is not one over which a revolution (or even a Happening) can be 
staged.129 Yet it does deserve exposure in the hope that a more ra-
tional approach may be forthcoming. 
Apart from a deliberate charter violation, there is always a 
possibility that an issuer might be compelled to recognize both the 
bona fide purchaser of the security as well as the true owner, and 
that as a consequence an overissue could result. For instance, the 
issuer may be required both to issue a certificate to the bona fide 
purchaser for 100 shares and, because it negligently ignored the 
stop transfer notice on its records, also to issue a certificate to the 
true owner for 100 shares.130 Thus, 200 shares would be outstanding 
where only 100 were before. A similar situation could arise when 
a certificate is apparently lost, stolen, or destroyed, and a replacement 
certificate is issued, and subsequently the missing certificate turns 
up.181 Thus, in several instances, compulsory validation of securities 
could create an overissue. 
Under a rational approach, issuers would have to validate secu-
rities in these circumstances regardless of an overissue in order to 
protect both the innocent purchaser and the true owners. This 
could be implemented by a statutory provision to the following 
effect: Whatever the charter says about the number of authorized 
shares, any additional number may be issued to validate an over-
issue without securing a shareholder-approved amendment. This 
proposed provision would not violate policies underlying the old 
rule against overissue-protection against dilution of the outstand-
ing share interests and against manipulation of the share structure. 
First, the likelihood of this form of manipulation, given all the 
others that are available to those so inclined, is too slight to matter; 
128. Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice &: Hutchins, 17 Del. Ch. 356, 152 At!. 342 (Sup. Ct. 
1930). 
129. In the larger corporation there is at least an independent transfer agent, and 
more often, both a transfer agent and a registrar. The latter maintains a close watch on 
the relation between the total shares outstanding and the total number of authorized 
shares. The New York Stock Exchange rules require both a separate transfer agent and 
a registrar for securities listed on the ".Big Board." 
130. u.c.c. § 8-404(2). 
131. u.c.c. § 8-405(2). 
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but if it did happen, the wrongdoing parties could be called to ac-
count. Second, substantial dilution of outstanding interests is also 
unlikely, but such dilution could as well occur if the corporation had 
to recognize two shareholders for one and had the authorized but un-
issued shares to do so. The problem, then, is not one peculiar to over-
issue. In addition, although compulsory validation of overissue 
might be harmful in a close corporation whose carefully devised 
balance of control might be upset, in this environment share trans-
fers are relatively less frequent, some form of restriction on transfer 
usually is present, and the pertinent facts are likely to be known. 
Thus, there is no real barrier to validating overissues by statutory 
provision. 
In lieu of this simple approach, the Code requires the corpora-
tion to purchase and deliver "an identical security which does not 
constitute an overissue"132 and, if no such security is "immediately 
available for purchase," then to respond to the wronged security 
holder in damages.183 However, there are difficulties here. Assuming 
a supply of securities which is "reasonably available for purchase," 
the corporation may be financially unable to purchase the shares. 
This financial difficulty may be due to many things, for example, 
indenture requirements for maintaining a specified cash position 
or limiting the purchase of shares, or perhaps, corporation law 
restrictions on the accounts out of which share purchases may be 
made.184 No corporation law provision for share repurchases ex-
pressly recognizes the small but knotty problem these restrictions 
could pose, and certainly the Code does not. If the Code continues 
to stick to this procedure, corporation statutes should, in the case 
of stock acquisitions to validate an overissue, remove the normal 
limitations on use of corporate funds just as they do with regard 
to the corporate purchase of a shareholder's interest under the ap-
praisal remedy.135 
The Code provision has another complication. Assuming shares 
which are "reasonably available for purchase," and the existence of 
lawful corporate funds with which to make the purchase, the Code 
states that the holder of the overissue "may compel the issuer to 
purchase and deliver" the clean security.136 Does this ambiguous 
phrase "may compel" mean that the holder has an option either to 
compel the purchase of a new security or to pursue some other, un-
132. U.C.C. § 8-104(l)(a). 
133. u.c.c. § 8-104(1). 
134. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513(a) (McKinney 1963). 
135. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 513(b)(3) (McKinney 1963). 
Jll6. U.C.C. § 8-104(l)(a). 
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defined, remedy, such as the traditional remedy of damages? Assum-
ing that the damage option is not pre-empted by a remedy of com-
pulsory substitute purchase, the measure of damage is uncertain. 
Since, by hypothesis, the security is "reasonably available," clearly 
the measure of damages stated in section 8-104(1)(b) is inapplicable, 
since it applies only to securities not "reasonably available for 
purchase." If the Code is to pursue the section 8-104(1)(b) approach, 
it should have made clear that, if the security is "reasonably avail-
able," purchase is the exclusive remedy. Since the security holder's 
original intention was to obtain (and hold) the security, his reason-
able expectations are fulfilled if his sole remedy is to get a "clean" 
security. 
The Code remedy where the identical security is not available 
for purchase is recovery of the price which the security holder or 
the last purchaser for value paid for it with interest. Although 
intended to settle the case-law muddle over the measure of damages 
and to prevent speculation, this rule produces some curious results 
which, in fact, have just the opposite effect.187 The upshot is that 
the overissue remedy is one of the less effective provisions of Ar-
ticle Eight, and that consequently it should be eliminted in favor 
of the clearcut and simple remedy of validation of overissued 
securities.188 
137. Suppose that A purchases part of a new stock issue at 20 in 1964 not knowing 
that his shares constituted part of an overissue. He learns of the defect in 1965 and 
demands that the corporation furnish him with a security which is not part of the over-
issue, but such a security is not "reasonably available for purchase." Under § 8-104(l)(b), 
he may "recover from the issuer the price he or the last purchaser for value paid for 
it •••• " Suppose that, at the time of A's demand to the issuer, the shares are worth 10, 
whereas the last purchaser for value paid 14. If A can enforce his demand, he has a 
nice advantage over shareholders who received no part of the overissue, because he re-
ceives at least $14.00-the price paid by the last purchaser for value. True, he has suf-
fered a loss of $6.00, but the other shareholders have a paper loss of $10.00. The tables 
are turned, however, if the shares A bought in 1964 at 20 are now worth 50, with the 
last purchaser for value having paid 45. Under the Code rule, the corporation need only 
pay A $45.00 at a time when the shares are worth $50.00. Thus, while he has a "gain" 
of $25.00 per share, the other shareholders have a paper profit of $30.00 per share. Ob-
viously, A would prefer to have shares rather than the $45.00, especially if the stock is 
rising in value. 
138. Some of the uncertainties in the present Code provision-bad as it is in concept 
-could be clarified by revising the language of§ 8-104(l)(a) & (b) as follows: 
(a) if an identical security which does not constitute an overissue is reasonably 
available for purchase, or is otherwise available for delivery, the exclusive 
remedy of the person entitled to issue or validation shall be to compel the 
issuer to deliver or purchase and deliver such a security to him against sur-
render of the security, if any, which he holds; 
(b) if a security is not so available for purchase, or otherwise available for deliv-
ery, the person entitled to issue or validation may recover from the issuer the 
fair value of an identical security which does not constitute an overissue with 
interest from the date of his demand. 
(New material in italics.) 
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C. The Code and the Simplification Act 
The Uniform Commercial Code continues in force the Uni-
form Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers, and 
indeed makes the latter's provisions controlling in the event of in-
consistency.139 The reason for so doing is unclear, since Article Eight 
of the Code seemingly adopts all of the Simplification Act provi-
sions, admittedly with some language changes, and generalizes them 
into rules applicable to all security transfers and not just to fiduciary 
transactions. Thus, there appears to be no conflict between the two 
statutes on substantive questions. However, the parallel effective-
ness of the two statutes raises a vexing problem. The Simplification 
Act is permissive; it purports to relieve issuers and transfer agents 
of the old common-law duty of policing the rightfulness of security 
transfers by fully investigating any proposed transfer of record of a 
fiduciary-owned security. Although the Code adopts the concepts 
of the Simplification Act, it is clearly much more than a merely per-
missive enactment. First, section 8-401 establishes the judicially en-
forceable duty of a transfer agent or issuer to register transfer of 
securities under precisely stated circumstances,140 and it also defines 
and limits their liabilities when they have fulfilled that duty.141 
Thus, if a fiduciary security transfer is presented for registration 
and complies with the Code requirements-and thereby with the 
similar requirements of the Simplification Act-the transfer agent 
must act. Second, the Code affirmatively discourages transfer agents 
from seeking "excess" documentation as to the rightfulness of a 
transfer. For if they demand more than the Code calls for, they are 
considered to have constructive notice of everything contained in 
those "excess" documents which bears upon the rightfulness of the 
transfers, for example, non-compliance with the terms of a con-
trolling instrument or court order or other breaches of trust.142 
Thus, the transfer agent can become liable to the true owner if he 
registers such a wrongful transfer.143 The Simplification Act con-
tains no such sanction. 
Probably the Code draftsmen decided to continue the Simplifi-
cation Act in force because it has become familiar to transfer agents 
in many states. It is also more comfortable for this cautious breed 
of people to work with a statute using their customary language 
139. u.c.c. § 10-104(2). 
140. U.C.C. § 8-401(2) states the duty, while § 8-401(1), together with §§ 8-402 &: 8-403, 
delimit the circumstances creating the duty. 
141. u.c.c. § 8-404. 
142. U.C.C. §§ 8-402(4) &: 8-403(I)(b). 
143. u.c.c. § 8-404. 
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rather than the new and somewhat artificial (although more ac-
curate) Code terminology.144 Thus, while the purpose was pre-
sumably benign, the relation between Code and Act is cloudy. 
Surely the Code draftsmen did not intend to relieve transfer agents 
and issuers of Code-imposed duties by giving strict priority to the 
Simplification Act's permissive provisions. Yet the saving clause 
contained in the Code can be construed as subordinating these 
duties, even though this construction does violence to Article Eight's 
objectives. For example, it would undermine the Code sanctions 
against requiring undue documentation if transfer agents could 
continue the old practices on the ground that the apparently over-
riding provisions of the Simplification Act lacked any such sanctions. 
Thus the Code's clause saving the effectiveness of the Simplifi-
cation Act contains a serious ambiguity. It is hoped that the courts 
will read it as giving pre-eminence to the Simplification Act only 
on those matters of substance as to which there is clear conflict, 
but not as relieving issuers and transfer agents of the specific duties 
and sanctions of the Code. Such a construction is reasonable. It can 
fairly be said that there is no "inconsistency" between the Code's 
duties and sanctions and the mere silence of the Simplification Act 
as to such duties and sanctions, but that the Code-a later and more 
refined statute-supplements the Act with certain additional provi-
sions needed to implement the common purposes of the Code and 
the Act. Only on this reading can full effect be accorded to the 
Code's evident intention to put teeth into its efforts to simplify 
registration of transfer. Nevertheless, it would probably be a better 
solution to eliminate the saving clause altogether and repeal the 
Simplification Act; if this is unacceptable, the saving clause should 
be reworded to make clear that the duties, liabilities, and sanctions 
contained in Article Eight are effective even though the Simplifi-
cation Act remains in force. 
144. E.g., one who "transfers" a security (under the Code), "assigns" it (Simplification 
Act and transfer-agent-lingo), while when a transfer agent or issuer "registers transfer" 
of a security (Code), he simply "transfers" it (Simplification Act) or-to complicate 
matters further-transfers it "of record" so that the transferee becomes a "holder of 
record" (typical corporation statute). 
